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PROPERTY LAW AND INEQUALITY: LESSONS
FROM RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Carol M. Rose
ABSTRACT—A long-standing justification for the institution of property is
that it encourages effort and planning, enabling not only individual wealth
creation but, indirectly, wealth creation for an entire society. Equal
opportunity is a precondition for this happy outcome, but some have argued
that past inequalities of opportunity have distorted wealth distribution in
contemporary America. This article explores the possible role of property
law in such a distortion, using the historical example of racially restrictive
covenants in the first half of the twentieth century. I will argue that the
increasing professionalization and standardization of real estate practices in
that era included racial covenants to appeal to a predominately white market
clientele, resulting in a curtailment of opportunities for African Americans
to acquire wealth in real estate. Racial covenants have been unenforceable
under constitutional law since 1948, but I will argue that they were also a
distortion of standard property law and that they undermined the principles
on which property law rests. Courts could have recognized this at the outset
and later, but for some reasons that this article suggests, they did not, with
long-lasting repercussions for racial wealth inequalities.
AUTHOR—Gordon Bradford Tweedy Professor of Law and Organization,
emerita, Yale Law School; and Ashby Lohse Professor of Natural Resource
Law, emerita, The University of Arizona. I want to thank especially Richard
Brooks, Jeannine Bell, Sheryll Cashin and Colin Gordon for brief but very
helpful exchanges about topics relating to this article.
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INTRODUCTION: TWO PROPERTIES, TWO EQUALITIES
The relationship of property to equality depends on what one means by
equality and property as well. Equality can mean many things, but two
meanings are clearly on the list: equality as equal opportunity and equality
as equal outcomes.1 Property, too, can mean many things. An older theory of
property, common in Europe well into the Enlightenment era, was what I
have called property as propriety—that is, property ideally meant a set of
assets that corresponded to a person’s or institution’s role in the “body
politic.”2 Thus the king, to take the example of the head of state, had a royal
endowment that was supposed to fund his governing responsibilities; others
had endowments suited to their roles. This is a static version of property,
much associated with hierarchy in the past, and it had little to do with
equality of any sort; by the nature of the era’s view of the body politic,
persons with different roles had differing endowments and opportunities.3

1
Wilfred U. Codrington III, The Benefits of Equity in the Constitutional Quest for Equality,
43 HARBINGER 105, 106 (2019); see also Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental
Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1028–84 (1993)
(describing varying conceptions of the closely allied idea of fairness, some involving equal chances and
others involving equality of outcome).
2
CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC
OF OWNERSHIP 58–60 (1994).
3
Id.; cf. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY
IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776–1970, at 1–3 (1997) (borrowing the terminology of propriety as
responsibility but applying it to modern issues of community and public good).
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Since the eighteenth century, however, a much more dynamic theory of
property has taken hold and remains familiar today: property as an institution
that encourages labor, investment, and inventiveness. A leading proponent
of this view of property was Jeremy Bentham, who argued that secure
ownership assures the individual that she can take the gains of her effort and
planning; this assurance induces her to make more effort and plan more
carefully, with the implicit result that her growing wealth contributes to the
aggregate wealth of society.4 This view of property departs radically from
the older static and hierarchical understanding of property as propriety.
Instead, it fits easily with equality of opportunity. But it does not fit so easily
with equality of outcomes.5 If the idea of property is to encourage effort and
planning, then the aspiration to wealth is the driver of those industrious
actions, while the prospect of poverty is the whip that threatens the slothful
and careless. Inequality is thus built into this understanding of property’s
role. Bentham asserted forcefully that yes, a society can achieve equality by
disrupting secure property, but it will be the equality of primitive penury.6
In somewhat milder language, Madison’s famous Federalist No. 10
expressed a variant of Bentham’s argument in saying that “the first object of
government” is to protect “[t]he diversity in the faculties of men, from which
the rights of property originate.”7 However, even the ferocious Bentham
thought that security of property tended toward equality over time, given the
bad habits of the rich and the diligence of the less well-off.8 That same
optimism (or perhaps pessimism)9 is embodied in the maxim “shirtsleeves to
shirtsleeves in three generations.”10 That is, wealth cannot be permanently
concentrated, at least not in free and easy America. Instead, in the expected
pattern, a first generation works hard, plans, saves, and acquires the assets
that a second generation manages to keep, whereupon the third squanders it
4
See JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of the Civil Code, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM pt. 1,
ch. 7, 11 (Bowring ed., Russell & Russell Inc. 1962).
5
See id. at pt. 1, ch. 11.
6
Id. More modernly, and with a libertarian angle, Robert Nozick echoes Bentham’s argument that
political attempts to achieve equality require violence or at least continual disruptions. See ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 160–74 (1974). Readers of both may dispute which is the
more colorful.
7
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 43 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).
8
See BENTHAM, supra note 4, at pt. 1, ch. 12.
9
See, e.g., Dennis Jaffe, The ‘Shirtsleeves-to-Shirtsleeves’ Curse: How Family Wealth Can Survive
It, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2019, 1:38 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dennisjaffe/2019/01/28/theshirtsleeves-to-shirtsleeves-curse-how-family-wealth-can-survive-it/?sh=34274f476c8d
[https://perma.cc/G89M-KDPZ] (describing ways to keep wealth in the family).
10
Shirtsleeves to Shirtsleeves in Three Generations, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.
encyclopedia.com/humanities/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/shirtsleevesshirtsleeves-three-generations [https://perma.cc/58TF-5V7A] (describing the maxim and giving an
English variation).
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all on luxury goods, wild parties, utopian projects and the like; in the end,
the great-grandchildren once again have to roll up their shirtsleeves and start
over. Thus, according to the saying, given time, social mobility will trump
inequality.
Yale Law Professor Daniel Markovits rejects this softening narrative.
He argues that the shirtsleeves-to-shirtsleeves story may have described
accurately a general social mobility in earlier decades, but that the account
failed by the later twentieth century. By now, he argues, an upper-middle
class has halted general social mobility by the very virtues that Bentham and
Madison would have extolled, as well as by the political principles that
protect those virtues. The current crop of the well-to-do works hard, plans
carefully, lives relatively modestly but with attention to health and
exercise—but then passes on its advantages to its own next generation, in the
form of elite education, good health, and stellar examples to follow.11 These
bequeathed advantages take the form of human capital, and the resulting
wealth may not be so easily squandered. Thus a virtuous upper-middle class
perpetuates its own advantages, giving the lie to the illusion of a larger social
mobility.
The Markovits thesis breaks decisively with any neat bifurcation of
equality of opportunity and equality of outcomes; instead it depicts a society
in which outcomes determine opportunity, and in which the political
protections of property perpetuate those outcomes. Nevertheless, this thesis
is based on a historical progression, and no doubt some will wonder whether
things might not revert to the older cycle; perhaps today’s exercise and selfimprovement addicts will find themselves confronting a rebel generation of
self-indulgent, profligate children, once again evening out intergenerational
opportunity.
It does not take a great deal of perspicacity, however, to observe that in
fact for some groups, things have not evened out over a very considerable
number of generations. Minority groups in particular remain in the grip of
what famed sociologist Charles Tilly has called durable inequality.12
Does property law play a role in this kind of long-lasting unequal state?
In the Parts that follow, I trace one historical example in which property law
did contribute to inequality both of opportunity and outcome: the
proliferation of racially restrictive covenants in residential properties in the
first half of the twentieth century. These covenants were very much a part of
11
See DANIEL MARKOVITS, THE MERITOCRACY TRAP 3–11 (2019) (arguing that an earlier
aristocracy of “leisured elite” has been displaced by a “meritocratic elite” of hard-driving, well-educated
professionals who pass on their traits to their children).
12
See generally CHARLES TILLY, DURABLE INEQUALITY (1998) (describing patterns in which social
groups remain in unequal position vis-à-vis one another).
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American property law in that era. While they have not been legally
enforceable for well over seventy years, and while they are only one of
several factors that have fed racial inequalities, their legacy continues to
influence residential patterns to this day.
The larger question, however, is whether property law intrinsically
fosters these kinds of pernicious inequalities, or whether property law is
neutral or even a brake on them. To give a preview, my own view is that
property law in general definitely has desirable elements to cabin the way
prejudices may limit opportunity, but that we cannot expect property law to
save us from our own worst impulses.
I.

A PRIMER ON RACIAL COVENANTS

One might view racially restrictive covenants as a test case of the
relationship of property law to equality—or inequality. These covenants
were ostensibly private deed restrictions or neighborhood agreements; they
aimed to exclude certain racial groups—particularly African Americans but
also Asians in western cities—from purchasing or living in homes in the
covenanted neighborhoods. Racial covenants had existed in scattered
properties in the nineteenth century, but after about 1910, they became
increasingly prevalent in cities and suburban areas all across the country.13
For decades, state court decisions generally upheld such covenants, but in
1948, the Supreme Court determined that the judiciary could not enforce
them without violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution’s
Fourteenth Amendment.14 Twenty years later, the Fair Housing Act of 1968
made it flatly illegal to refer to racial restrictions in most real estate
transactions, effectively outlawing new racial covenants while barring the
enforcement or even the mention of the older covenants that remained in the
records.15 Nevertheless, as will be described below, racial covenants
contributed to continuing patterns of residential segregation and unequal
access to real estate.

13
RICHARD R.W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS 3 (2013); ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BOURGEOIS
NIGHTMARES: SUBURBIA, 1870–1930, at 67 (2005); see Maureen E. Brady, Turning Neighbors into
Nuisances, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1609, 1621–22 (2021).
14
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948); see also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 258 (1953)
(prohibiting a damages claim against a home seller for violating a racial covenant).
15
BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 207–08.
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A. Early Twentieth Century: Racial Covenants
and Emergent Real Estate Practices
Charles Tilly argues that a phenomenon that he calls “opportunity
hoarding” is central to durable inequality—that is, a pattern in which
members of a group, when given the chance to recommend or award any
kind of opportunity, consider only members of the same group.16 One could
certainly understand the decades of enforceable racial covenants as an
example: white property owners wanted to keep residential areas for
themselves, and they used then-legal racial covenants to hoard these areas to
the exclusion of minority citizens.
This characterization is true as far as it goes, but there was more to the
racial covenant story. An additional factor of great importance was the earlytwentieth-century transformation of real estate development into a set of
standardized practices, put into effect by an increasingly professional real
estate industry.17 These standardizing practices effectively turned the white
home buyer into the model customer at the center of real estate development,
finance, sales, and even rentals, with the effect of marginalizing persons of
other races into niche real estate markets.18 In this context, what Tilly
described as opportunity hoarding might better be described as “crowding
out,” and racial covenants became a key element of this emerging trend.
During the early decades of the twentieth century, real estate developers
increasingly began to create whole new areas of housing, as opposed to
operating with one or a few lots at a time.19 High-end developers were early
movers in this pattern; they created whole new subdivisions, often on the
outskirts of cities or just beyond the borders, in quiet areas that had become
more easily accessible with the increasing use of automobiles. After
acquiring a development area, such a developer would divide it into lots and
install the physical infrastructure such as roads and curbs. But the developer
also added a legal infrastructure of deed restrictions that “ran with the land”
to successive owners,20 thus making certain that lot purchasers and their
successors would follow the developer’s plan for a gracious and attractive
community. Restrictive covenants in these deeds largely covered such
16

TILLY, supra note 12, at 91.
The most extensive description of this process is MARC A. WEISS, THE RISE OF THE COMMUNITY
BUILDERS: THE AMERICAN REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY AND URBAN LAND PLANNING (1987). For the
history of the suburbs, see FOGELSON, supra note 13; and KENNETH T. JACKSON, THE CRABGRASS
FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985).
18
Carol M. Rose, Raisin, Race, and the Real Estate Revolution of the Early Twentieth Century, in
POWER, PROSE, AND PURSE: LAW, LITERATURE, AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS 288–89 (Alison L.
LaCroix, Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2019).
19
WEISS, supra note 17, at 45.
20
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles and Policies 1038 (2d ed. 2012).
17
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matters as building styles and sizes, setbacks, and landscaping, as well as
limiting uses to one-family dwellings.21 By the 1920s, however, racial
restrictions were common in luxury developers’ lists of restrictions required
for gracious living, limiting the residences to “Caucasians,” as one common
term had it.22
This was an era in which southern Black people had begun to migrate
in large numbers to cities, including mid-south and northern cities, but the
“high-class”23 real estate developers could reasonably assume that their chief
clientele would still be white purchasers. They could further assume that
many members of this white clientele would not wish to live near African
Americans; as one real estate treatise put it, “[p]roperty values have been
sadly depreciated by” the entry of even “a single colored family” to a white
street.24 The treatise authors went on to say that while African Americans
enjoyed the “right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness . . . they must
recognize the economic disturbance which their presence in a white
neighborhood causes” and should refrain from moving beyond their own
“established district[s].”25
Even before this comment, several city governments, alarmed at the
influx of southern Black migrants, had passed zoning ordinances to keep the
races apart, claiming that segregation was necessary to keep the peace and
maintain property values.26 But the Supreme Court blocked racial zoning in
1917. In Buchanan v. Warley, a case orchestrated by the newly formed
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the
Court ruled that this kind of governmental measure violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.27
Unlike zoning, real estate covenants were ostensibly private
arrangements, outside the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment’s limitations
on governmental actions—or so ruled several important state supreme court

21

FOGELSON, supra note 13, at 14–19.
See BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 103–05. For background on the term “Caucasians,” see
CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE RESTRICTIVE
COVENANT CASES 57–64 (1959) (describing NAACP efforts against racial covenants).
23
See WEISS, supra note 17, at 15 (noting developers’ use of “high-class” designation).
24
STANLEY L. MCMICHAEL & ROBERT F. BINGHAM, CITY GROWTH AND VALUES 181 (1923).
25
Id. at 181–82.
26
BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 38–41; MCMICHAEL & BINGHAM, supra note 24, at 182.
27
245 U.S. 60, 79–82 (1917); see also Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early
NAACP (1910–1920), 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 104, 126–28 (2002) (discussing the founding of the
NAACP and the organization’s involvement in the lawsuit challenging a Kentucky zoning ordinance);
BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 41–42 (describing the NAACP as leading the challenge to the
Kentucky ordinance).
22
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decisions.28 As a result, after Buchanan, racial covenants became the main
legal vehicle through which housing discrimination could be accomplished.
High-end developers began to use them routinely to assuage their white
clients’ fears of minority entrance; racially restrictive covenants became a
kind of marketing tool along with other restrictions.29 Sadly enough, they
were very popular even outside the high-end subdivisions. In the 1920s and
afterwards, restrictions on race migrated from the highest priced real estate
developments to middle-class and even some working-class developments.30
B. 1920s: Racial Covenants Expand
In older urban areas that were already built out, white residents could
not deploy the new developments’ deed restrictions to keep their streets
segregated. But by the mid-1920s, real estate boards and neighborhood
improvement associations (NIAs) in these older areas hit upon a different
form: the racial covenant by petition. NIAs collected pledges through the
blocks stating that none of the owners or their successors would sell or rent
to minority members, and then recorded the petition documents.31 These
covenants by petition had some weaknesses, however, particularly by
comparison to the subdivision covenants. They often failed to include correct
signatures of all the parties in the relevant blocks, and they lacked one of the
formal property law requirements for covenants running with the land—that
they originate with a lease or sale of the property. Because of the latter issue,
they could only be enforced against later purchasers, ironically enough, by
courts using their equitable powers.32
Despite these vulnerabilities, however, increasingly professionalized
real estate brokers in the 1920s led the efforts to cover neighborhoods with
racial covenants. The National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB)
was founded in 1908, with the trademarked name “Realtor” for its
members.33 By 1924, NAREB’s “Realtor’s Code of Ethics” included, among
28

See Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary, 186 P. 596, 597–98 (Cal. 1919); Queensborough Land Co. v.
Cazeaux, 67 So. 641, 643 (La. 1915); Porter v. Barrett, 206 N.W. 532, 533 (Mich. 1925); Koehler v.
Rowland, 205 S.W. 217, 220 (Mo. 1918).
29
FOGELSON, supra note 13, at 119–27 (describing developers’ deployment of deed restrictions,
including racial restrictions, as a marketing tool).
30
For a discussion of the use of racial covenants in different socioeconomic developments, see
BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 104–05.
31
See id. at 106–07.
32
Id. at 78–83 (describing how neighbor-collected covenants were often sloppier than subdivision
covenants and violated “horizontal privity,” a doctrine requiring covenants to be included in the original
deed in order to give notice to later purchasers).
33
WEISS, supra note 17, at 22, 24. NAREB is now NAR, for National Association of Realtors.
History, NAT’L ASS’N REALTORS, https://www.nar.realtor/about-nar/history [https://perma.cc/PCG7XSDE].
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other things, a section stating that a realtor would not introduce into any
neighborhood “members of any race or nationality . . . whose presence will
clearly be detrimental to property values.”34 Thereafter, NAREB affiliates
accelerated their encouragement of local NIAs’ petition drives, with
Chicago’s chapter offering a model petition for a racial covenant as well as
a helpful pamphlet entitled “Choose Your Neighbors.”35
Thus as the real estate industry professionalized, developers and
brokers standardized their practices for a target clientele of white buyers and
owners; racial restrictions were the contribution of property law to that
standardization. White-centric standardization effectively turned housing for
minorities into a niche market, offering smaller numbers and less
profitability than the mainstream (and exclusionary) white market. There
were certainly real estate entrepreneurs who served minority clients, and
some did quite well. Chicago’s Carl Hansberry was known both for his civil
rights activism and for converting larger apartments into smaller
“kitchenettes.”36 Earl Dickerson, general counsel and later president of the
Supreme Liberty Life Insurance Company, was an important institutional
player in mortgage finance for African Americans in Chicago and
elsewhere.37 But as niche-market entrepreneurs, minority real estate dealers
were squeezed into limited areas with correspondingly limited opportunities.
Unsurprisingly, some worked with local NAACPs in legal challenges to
racial covenants, including Hansberry, Dickerson, and a group of Black real
estate brokers in St. Louis.38 Meanwhile, however, for their minority
clientele, niche-market status meant higher priced residences of
lower quality.

34

ROSE HELPER, RACIAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS 201, 221 (1969).
BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 121. The NAR apologized in 2020 for its role in perpetuating
discrimination. See NAR Apologizes for Housing Discrimination, REAL DEAL, (Nov. 20, 2020,
12:03 PM), https://therealdeal.com/national/2020/11/20/national-association-of-realtors-apologizes-forhousing-discrimination [https://perma.cc/6NT7-4XE3].
36
Jay Tidmarsh, The Story of Hansberry: The Foundation for Modern Class Actions, in CIVIL
PROCEDURE STORIES 233, 252–53 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008). Hansberry was to become even
better known as the father of playwright Lorraine Hansberry; for Lorraine’s unsettled childhood
perspective on her parents’ activism, see IMANI PERRY, LOOKING FOR LORRAINE: THE RADIANT AND
RADICAL LIFE OF LORRAINE HANSBERRY 11–13 (2018).
37
See ROBERT J. BLAKELY & MARCUS SHEPARD, EARL B. DICKERSON: A VOICE FOR FREEDOM AND
EQUALITY 95–100, 166–88 (2006); Tidmarsh, supra note 36, at 279 (describing Supreme Liberty as “the
leading African-American business of its day”).
38
Tidmarsh, supra note 36, at 252–56; BLAKELY & SHEPARD, supra note 37, at 95–101; JEFFREY D.
GONDA, UNJUST DEEDS: THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES AND THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 60, 68–70 (2015).
35
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C. 1930s: Racial Covenants Infiltrate the New Deal
Perhaps the most important steps in standardizing white-centric real
estate practices came with the New Deal of the 1930s, and these too leaned
on racial covenants. White real estate professionals who had emerged in the
1920s went to Washington in the 1930s, where they brought with them their
views on race relations in housing. There they led the new federal agencies
that were created to boost a deeply sagging housing market.39 The Home
Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) was created early in the new
administration to make housing loans; as a part of its lending program, the
HOLC created color-coded maps of many cities to reflect risk levels.
Minority areas were considered most at risk and coded red, a color choice
that would later give rise to the term “redlining,” although the HOLC itself
did make loans in these areas.40 By the later 1930s, however, the newer
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) became the centerpiece of
governmental housing support; instead of lending directly, the FHA insured
bank-created mortgages, to be structured as long-term, self-amortizing loans
with relatively low down payments.41 But the FHA very much took race into
account in its assessment of the risk levels of the many mortgages it insured.
In its later 1930s manual of criteria for loan approval, the FHA directed
agents to look for restrictive covenants in new subdivisions—including
racial covenants.42
D. The Postwar Period and Beyond:
Shelley, Barrows, and the Fair Housing Act
Because FHA insurance was so important in supporting new home
purchases, racial covenants became routine in new subdivisions from the
later 1930s through the first years of the housing boom that followed the
Second World War.43 The first houses in the vast new Long Island Levittown

39

WEISS, supra note 17, at 29, 146.
JACKSON, supra note 17, at 196–202.
41
BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 108. Although this new system under the FHA was
standardized and housing officials were not wielding it to discriminate directly, by “defin[ing] minority
occupancy as a threat to property values,” it continued the tradition of discrimination in housing. DAVID
M.P. FREUND, COLORED PROPERTY: STATE POLICY AND WHITE RACIAL POLITICS IN SUBURBAN
AMERICA 128–35 (2007) (describing the effects of the FHA’s racial policies).
42
BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 108–09. For more on both the HOLC’s and the FHA’s
emphasis on race as a factor in mortgage risk, see RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A
FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 63–67 (2017) (describing the
explicit references to race in HOLC mapping and FHA publications and policies).
43
BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 108–11. The FHA manual removed explicit approval of racial
covenants in 1947, although the agency later did little to encourage integration. Id. at 170–71; see also
FREUND, supra note 41, at 132–35 (describing the long-term impact of FHA racial policies).
40
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subdivision went on sale in 1947, and they included racially restrictive
covenants.44
By this time, however, racial covenants were coming under fire due to
several significant factors. Civil rights advocates sharply criticized the
segregation that met African-American soldiers upon their return from the
war against Nazism.45 The State Department, facing a rapidly developing
cold war with the Soviet Union, became increasingly concerned over the
embarrassment of racial discrimination, including housing discrimination.46
Meanwhile, the NAACP, under the leadership of Charles Hamilton Houston
and Thurgood Marshall, accelerated the legal battle against racial covenants,
ultimately challenging them before the Supreme Court.47
In 1948, the Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer held that racial
covenants were legally unenforceable by courts as “state action” in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.48 Even though
Shelley was unclear on how judicial enforcement of these covenants counted
as state action, the case did at least slow the proliferation of racial
covenants.49 After Shelley, which had invalidated an injunction against
African-American buyers, a follow-up case, Barrows v. Jackson (1953),
made clear that damages were also unavailable, holding that a white seller
could not be held liable for damages for selling a covenanted property to a
minority buyer.50 Even so, for a time, developers sometimes continued to
insert racial restrictions into deeds; Shelley and Barrows did not outlaw racial
covenants so long as they were simply voluntary, and as late as 1966, a real
estate manual made a point of saying that racial covenants were still legal
even if not enforceable, evidently useful as a signal of neighborhood
preferences.51

44

BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 138–39.
RAWN JAMES, JR., ROOT AND BRANCH: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON, THURGOOD MARSHALL,
AND THE STRUGGLE TO END SEGREGATION 188–89 (2010) (describing Houston’s speeches comparing
segregation to Nazi practices).
46
Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 98–105 (1988).
47
BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13 at 136–39; VOSE, supra note 22, at 57–69; Leland B. Ware,
Invisible Walls: An Examination of the Legal Strategy of the Restrictive Covenant Cases, 67 WASH. U.
L.Q. 737, 742–48 (1989).
48
334 U.S. 1, 19–21 (1948).
49
B.T. McGraw & George B. Nesbitt, Aftermath of Shelley Versus Kraemer on Residential
Restriction by Race, 29 LAND ECON. 280, 287 (1953) (describing how Shelley has resulted, “on balance,
in the freer mobility of nonwhites throughout the housing supply” but recognizing the continuing
existence of “resistances and obstructions of many sorts in acquiring suitable homes”).
50
346 U.S. 249, 259 (1953).
51
BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 171; Gabriel J. Chin, Jim Crow’s Long Goodbye, 21 CONST.
COMMENT. 107, 124–25 (2004).
45
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The 1968 Fair Housing Act finally put an end to new racial covenants,
and among other matters the Act forbade reference to discrimination in the
sale of housing, including advertising and finance—a provision covering
reference to past covenants as well.52 Racial covenants live on, however, or
at least their influence does.
II. THE AFTERLIFE OF RACIAL COVENANTS
The following Sections recount some of the most prominent patterns in
which racial covenants are still with us—in the land records, in the
geography of segregation, in white anxiety about housing values, and in
persistent economic inequality.
A. Recording Issues
The most literal way in which racial covenants live on is in their
continued presence in land records. Take a house built in, say, a 1941
suburban development: given the importance of FHA mortgage insurance
for everyone involved at the time—the builder, the broker, the buyer, the
mortgage banker, the title insurer—the house is very likely to have had a
racial covenant in its initial documents of title, and that covenant is very
likely to be written in such a way as to run with the land for so long as the
house stands and possibly even longer.53
As a consequence, when the property changes hands years later, all
these participants may be confronted with racial restrictions—now not
enforceable, not even legal to mention, but still part of the chain of title, as
reflected in the past records of ownership and interests in the house. The
parties most directly affected are title insurers, who are forbidden by the Fair
Housing Act and comparable state legislation to refer to discrimination in
housing transactions, but who also have a professional responsibility to
disclose to home purchasers all claims against the property, on pain of
liability for undisclosed but valid claims.54 Title insurers who prepare
52

42 U.S.C. § 3604(c); BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 207.
See BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 110 (describing explicit references to FHA racial standards
in deeds to new homes built in the early 1940s). Some subdivisions provided that racial restrictions would
be permanent conditions on the lots even though other restrictions had a time limit. See, e.g., PIMA
COUNTY RECORDER’S OFFICE, Declaration of Establishment of Conditions and Restrictions, in
20 MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS 238–39 (providing that racial restrictions would be a permanent condition
for the Sam Hughes neighborhood of Tucson, Arizona).
54
BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 223–26. As these pages relate, shortly after the passage of the
Fair Housing Act, the Justice Department contacted several major title-insurance companies to seek their
compliance. Title insurers were particularly concerned about one form of racial restriction whose validity
might have escaped the Shelley ruling. This was the defeasible fee, which returned a property to the seller
in case of breach; if not disclosed, this interest might conceivably have made title insurers liable. See
BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 225–26.
53
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documents of sale have taken various routes around this bind: some noting
but crossing out references to discriminatory clauses, others annotating them
as unenforceable, some simply deleting them or alternatively leaving their
annotation in place.55
For their part, home purchasers may well not bother to read deeds or
title-insurance documents, given the reams of paper that they see at closings.
When they do see references to past discriminatory restrictions, they too may
have a variety of reactions: indifference, indignance to varying degrees, or
something else. Former Chief Justice Rehnquist, when told of racial
restrictions on one of his former homes, brushed the news aside with the
comment that (a) he hadn’t known and (b) they weren’t enforceable
anyway.56 My coauthor Richard Brooks and I have been told by many people
about their reactions when learning about old racial restrictions on their own
properties. One, an African-American law professor in Los Angeles, thought
them hilarious. Another, a serious civil rights activist, related that he had
been outraged when he learned of old racial covenants on a house that he had
been in the process of purchasing in Ann Arbor, Michigan; he wanted the
covenant to be revoked, but he backed off when told by his attorney that the
process would cost roughly ten percent of the purchase price.
This attorney may have been exaggerating the cost, but probably not by
a great deal. The problem is that restrictive covenants of all kinds represent
interests that other parties have in any given owner’s property, and each of
these interests must be legally untangled in order to be removed. The owner
cannot unilaterally revoke another person’s legal interests in her property,
such as a driveway easement or a covenant to pay dues to the homeowners’
association. Unless another method is authorized by statute or in the
covenants themselves, the only by-the-book route to revocation is to gather
the consents of all interested parties, and then to record the revocation—even
for a claim as feeble as one given by a now-illegal racial restriction. In the
case of multiple-owner subdivisions or common interest communities, even
those with somewhat relaxed rules for amendment, such an effort can be
prohibitively time-consuming and expensive for any objecting owner.57
Since about 2010, some civil rights groups and other persons have
revived public interest in racially restrictive covenants, treating them as a
55
Jeremy Yohe, Addressing a Painful Past, TITLENEWS, Oct. 2021, at 12,
https://digital.titlenews.org/titlenews/october_2021/MobilePagedArticle.action?articleId=1733443
[https://perma.cc/QBN8-ME6C]; BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 224.
56
BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 1–2.
57
See, e.g., United States v. Univ. Oaks Civic Club, 653 F. Supp. 1469, 1472–73 (S.D. Tex. 1987)
(noting the difficulty of amending a condominium restriction); Wayne S. Hyatt, Common Interest
Communities: Evolution and Reinvention, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 332 & n.126 (1998) (discussing
the difficulty for many common interest communities in changing covenants).
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part of the legacy of discrimination against minorities, and scouring old
records in projects with names like Mapping Segregation.58 One outcome of
these projects is a call for state legislatures to change the by-the-book
property rules, at least in the case of racial restrictions, and to make it
possible for individual owners to revoke these restrictions unilaterally.
Another is to forbid the recordation of any references to racial restrictions,
including those in past documents.59
Some states have responded to these efforts to renounce or even
expunge references to racial covenants, but there are a surprising number of
technical obstacles.60 One problem is that recorders of deeds normally check
only for matters such as signatures, notarization, and other such formalities,
without considering the content of the documents that are recorded.
Checking for racial restrictions would add considerably to their duties.
Moreover, they might not easily recognize these restrictions, since racial
covenants are often passed on through general phrases in deeds and title
documents such as “subject to restrictions of record.” Checking for racial
restrictions thus could involve a search through records from many years in
the past. However odious they may be, old racial covenants most commonly
appear in packages of subdivision restrictions such as building setbacks and
association dues—restrictions that form the backbone of planned
communities of all kinds. States with marketable title acts limit the
effectiveness of older record claims, and they void property claims that are
not reasserted periodically.61 But because subdivision restrictions are
generally referenced at each subsequent property transfer, marketable title

58
See, e.g., PROLOGUE DC, LLC, MAPPING SEGREGATION IN WASHINGTON DC, https://mapping
segregationdc.org [https://perma.cc/7YJL-M6RN] (visualizing racial covenants in Washington, D.C.,
including interactive maps); About Us, MAPPING PREJUDICE, https://mappingprejudice.umn.edu/aboutus/index.html [https://perma.cc/UKT4-3C5G] (mapping a “comprehensive visualization of racial
covenants” in Minneapolis); see also Colin Gordon, Dividing the City: Race-Restrictive Covenants and
the Architecture of Segregation in St. Louis, J. URB. HIST. 1, 3 (2021) (discussing a historical mapping
project of racial covenants in St. Louis, Missouri).
59
See, e.g., CITY ROOTS CMTY. LAND TR. & YALE ENV’T PROT. CLINIC, CONFRONTING RACIAL
COVENANTS: HOW THEY SEGREGATED MONROE COUNTY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT THEM 36 (2020)
(advocating for the removal of racial covenants, discussing several flaws in various state laws that address
racial covenants, and suggesting potential improvements).
60
Id. at 37–44; Housing Discrimination: Addressing Illegal Covenants in Historic Land Records,
SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT TO TITLE NEWS, Oct. 2021, at 5, 7, https://digital.titlenews.org/titlenews/
october_2021/MobilePagedArticle.action?articleId=1733444 [https://perma.cc/44B8-PRG2]. Federal
legislation was introduced in July 2021 to encourage research into discriminatory land records. See Joshua
Jamerson, Senate Bill Aims to Create National Database of Restrictive Property Covenants, WALL ST. J.
(July 29, 2021, 1:22 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/senate-bill-aims-to-create-national-database-ofrestrictive-property-covenants-11627573734 [https://perma.cc/JD6Z-75K5].
61
See, e.g., Jason P. Seaver & Christopher R. Martella, Potential Legislative Solutions to Issues with
the Marketable Record Title Act After Public Act 572 of 2018, 46 MICH. REAL PROP. REV. 43, 44 (2019).
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acts have no effect on these restrictions. Unless there is some special
provision, any racial restrictions that they contain slide by as well.62 Besides,
even if voided by marketable title acts, old racial restrictions would linger in
the record books.
These technical difficulties can no doubt be overcome by careful
drafting, but important substantive issues remain. Probably the most
important is the question of whether and to what degree history should be
erased. Should the goal be to remove all racial restrictions from all recorded
documents, present, future, and past? From a preservation perspective, it
hardly seems desirable to alter the historical record. Even the current efforts
to map segregation would be severely impeded if past land-record documents
were redacted. Alternatively, should those who draw up and record title
documents be required to drop all references to racial restrictions from this
point on? Such a requirement would leave past records untouched. Might an
even more forceful repudiation occur if current owners could file their own
statements of renunciation? But then, what would it mean if some did and
some did not? Might it be more productive to think outside the records office
box, and to emulate the Stolpersteine movement in Germany—the placement
of small plaques outside the last homes of Jewish families and others
persecuted during the Nazi era?63 Could some version of such “stumbling
stones” act as a more powerful renunciation of past discrimination in so
many American neighborhoods?
All of these are just some of the questions that roil the revocation issue
today, and that have certainly shaken up the once-sleepy records and title
offices. But the racial covenants of the past cast a present shadow in other
ways as well.
B. Patterns of Urban and Suburban Segregation
“White flight” is a phenomenon well-known in the years after the
Second World War—a situation in which white residents fled their urban
homes for the suburbs.64 Racial restrictions played a part in the resulting
demographic division of the races, most directly because many suburban
62
See UNIFORM SIMPLIFICATION OF LAND TRANSFERS ACT § 3-303 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1976)
(exempting easements and restrictions when record location is given). Marketable title acts use a past
deed of at least a certain age as a “root” of title, and recognize only claims mentioned therein or
subsequently, subject to periodic renewal. For some current issues, see Seaver & Martella, supra note 61,
at 43–44 (2019) (describing changes to an early marketable title act).
63
See Florence Wagman Roisman, Stumbling Stones at Levittown: What to Do About Racial
Covenants in the United States, 30 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 461, 463 (2022) (describing
the Stolpersteine movement and potential applications to racially covenanted neighborhoods in the
United States).
64
BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 5, 133, 187.
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developments included racial covenants up until the Shelley and Barrows
cases of the early 1950s. Less directly, racial restrictions had become an
ingrained practice by then. Even after explicit racial covenants dropped out
of new title documents, suburban real estate developers continued to sell only
to white purchasers. One of these was the Levitt Corporation, developer of
the several huge “Levittown” subdivisions. After the Shelley decision, Levitt
dropped racial covenants but still made initial sales only to white customers;
as the development firm’s general counsel explained in a 1962 hearing
before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, unless constrained by law, the
company as a business matter could not “offend the customs and traditions
of the locality in which our company operates.”65
I will not dwell on this well-known pattern—white suburbs with
minority and especially African-American inner cities—but I do want to
bring up one of the less well-known ways in which racial covenants
contributed to white flight. As described earlier, racial covenants took two
forms: subdivision restrictions and neighborhood restrictions by petition.66
Of the two, subdivision restrictions were much more formally correct,
originating with a single owner (the developer) and then passing on to all the
properties in any given subdivision. Moreover, subdividing usually involved
large swaths of previously undeveloped land, which meant that they emerged
at the outskirts of towns or outside the town borders—that is, in the suburbs.
Racial covenants by petition, on the other hand, because they lacked
some of the formal character that covenants usually required, could only be
enforced under a court’s equitable jurisdiction against persons who should
have known about them from the land records.67 More importantly, the
petition covenants often came into being within urban areas at the margins
of minority expansion, with signatures collected among white neighbors who
were often panic-stricken at the prospect that Black entrants would ruin their
property values.68 The resulting petitions generally failed to gain signatures
from all the owners, and they often stated a duration of twenty years, as
owners hedged their bets on the future of the neighborhood.69 Many of these
65
Housing in Washington: Hearings Before the U.S. Comm’n on Civ. Rts., 87th Cong. 244 (1962)
(Exhibit H–2, letter from Ira Goldman, Vice President and General Counsel, Levitt & Sons, to Martin E.
Sloane, Chief, Hous. Section, Comm’n on C.R.); Ira G. Goldman, 55, Dies; Executive of Levitt & Sons,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 1962), https://www.nytimes.com/1962/11/30/archives/ira-g-goldman-55-diesexecutive-of-levitt-sons.html [https://perma.cc/QWY7-32QY].
66
Supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
67
BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 82–83.
68
See id. at 81–82.
69
See id. at 82; HERMAN H. LONG & CHARLES S. JOHNSON, PEOPLE VS. PROPERTY: RACE
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN HOUSING 16–17 (1947) (describing most Chicago petition covenants as
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petition covenants simply fell apart under the pressure of minority influx,
and when white neighbors tried to assert them against minority residents,
lawyers for the latter could point out their many legal weaknesses.70 St. Louis
civil rights lawyer and later judge Scovel Richardson even wrote a short
primer on the ways that these covenants could be attacked, describing their
lack of co-owner signatures, signatures by nonowners, and other flaws.71
The picture, then, was one in which one neighborhood’s petition
covenants could collapse, leading to a breach in what Richardson called the
“ring of steel” of racial covenants around overcrowded African-American
areas.72 When such a breach occurred, an influx of minority homeseekers
frightened white residents in nearby neighborhoods, who then tried to create
petition covenants on their own blocks but who sometimes simply sold out
and left.73 By contrast, formally correct subdivision covenants gave the
outskirts and the suburbs more substantial legal protections for whiteness,
quite aside from the greater cost of homes in these areas.
The difference between weak, neighbor-organized petition covenants in
the inner city and strong subdivision covenants on the outskirts thus
contributed to a long-emerging pattern of stark metropolitan segregation.74
By the 1950s, when racial covenants could no longer be enforced, the pattern
had already been set, and would soon be sharply accelerated by shadowy
“blockbusting” brokers, who frightened white residents into flight to the
suburbs while opening up inner-city neighborhoods for minority residents.75
lasting between twenty and twenty-four years; describing the St. Louis Real Estate Exchange model
covenant as lasting twenty years with provisions for supermajority abrogation); see also THOMAS LEE
PHILPOTT, THE SLUM AND THE GHETTO 407–10 (1978) (reprinting a model petition covenant published
by the Chicago Real Estate Board, 1927, providing that the covenant would last until Jan. 1, 1949, with
provision for abrogation thereafter by owners of 60% of parcels).
70
BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 82–83, 86.
71
Scovel Richardson, Some of the Defenses Available in Restrictive Covenant Suits Against Colored
American Citizens in St. Louis, 3 NAT’L BAR J. 50, 51–53 (1945).
72
Id. at 51.
73
See, e.g., Porter v. Johnson, 115 S.W.2d 529, 533–35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938) (upholding a racial
covenant adopted when African Americans bought land nearby); COLIN GORDON, MAPPING DECLINE:
ST. LOUIS AND THE FATE OF THE AMERICAN CITY 80–81 (Glenda Gilmore, Michael Kazin & Thomas J.
Sugrue eds., 2008) (describing an attempt to enforce a racial covenant that failed in court “because the
original covenant had been so haphazardly assembled”); Gordon, supra note 58, at 10–11 (describing the
collapse of many petition covenants in St. Louis, including examples of selling out); ARNOLD R. HIRSCH,
MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO 1940–1960, at 30 (Robert Fogel &
Stephan Thernstrom eds., 1998) (describing the similar collapse of racial covenants in Chicago).
74
Gordon, supra note 58, at 14–16, 18–19 (noting that the pattern of failing inner-city petition
covenants, by contrast with more robust and continuing subdivision covenants, first influenced different
ratings for the HOLC and later intensified segregation across the metropolis).
75
BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 135–36, 189–90, 198. So-called blockbusters have had some
defenders. See id. at 208–09 (discussing how blockbusters created housing opportunities for minorities,
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The difference in these two types of covenants thus had an impact on the
long-lasting division of American metropolises into minority cores with
white outskirts.
C. Fear of Integration
The total time period within which racially restrictive covenants were
legal and extensively used was relatively short—at most four decades,
between 1915 and 1955. Yet this period helped to cement a thoroughly
malignant attitude toward residential integration: that any influx of minority
members, especially African Americans, would cause property values to
drop in a white neighborhood.
This view predated the widespread use of racial covenants, but the
burgeoning use of racial covenants, and the courts’ favorable adjudication of
them, reinforced it as a legitimate assumption. For example, in affirming a
racial covenant in 1938, Maryland’s highest court observed that, given the
influx of African Americans to cities, “all agree[d that] something ought to
be done,” and because the Supreme Court had inexplicably ruled against
racial zoning, it was no wonder that neighbors would take matters into their
own hands.76 A few years later, the Supreme Court of California, although
unwilling to enforce a particular racial restriction, still referred to “damage”
that had been done to a neighborhood by the “influx of negroes” on a nearby
street.77 Racial covenants helped to naturalize and rigidify assumptions of
this sort. White Americans could see that major institutions—real estate
professionals, the banks, the courts, even the federal government—upheld
racial restrictions and appeared to approve of them. It was small wonder that
these same white Americans came to believe that they were entitled to live
in all-white communities and that their homes retained value because the
communities were all white.78
Sociologist Robert Merton coined the phrase “self-fulfilling prophecy”
in 1948, and critics of racial covenants quickly dubbed the property-values
trope a prime example: if enough people believed the commonplace that
minority entry reduced housing value, then it would be reflected in market

despite unsavory practices); Dmitri Mehlhorn, A Requiem for Blockbusting: Law, Economics, and RaceBased Real Estate Speculation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1145, 1165–74 (1998) (arguing that blockbusting’s
harms to Black communities are overstated).
76
Meade v. Dennistone, 196 A. 330, 332–33 (Md. 1938).
77
Fairchild v. Raines, 151 P.2d 260, 263 (Cal. 1944).
78
BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 112–13; Thomas J. Sugrue, Crabgrass-Roots Politics: Race,
Rights, and the Reaction Against Liberalism in the Urban North, 1940–1964, 82 J. AM. HIST. 551,
564 (1995).
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prices and would thus became true.79 Shelley, Barrows, and later fair housing
legislation forbade discrimination based on this belief, but insofar as the
belief itself was concerned, the genie was already out of the bottle. This
sentiment is reflected in the depressing instances of move-in violence
described in Jeannine Bell’s Hate Thy Neighbor, including break-ins and
vandalism, rock-throwing, and even gunfire directed at newly arriving Black
residents in white areas.80
The property-values trope undoubtedly has less force today than it did
even twenty or twenty-five years ago, but the clues are still very evident.
Several news outlets ran a story at the end of 2021 about an AfricanAmerican couple who were surprised at the low sale valuation given to their
home. They devised a test: they removed all the family pictures, asked a
white friend to act as the seller, and requested a second valuation. This
second assessment came in about one-third higher than the first.81 The
assumption seems to have been that if an African-American family owned
the home, it would sell for less on the market, whereas white ownership
vouched for the home’s value. This story and others like it are only anecdotal,
but they suggest the continuing belief that minority entry lowers
property values.
D. Intergenerational Wealth Differences
Racially restrictive covenants are sometimes cited as one of the factors
contributing to the dearth of intergenerational wealth transfer in many
minority families.82 The charge is that racial covenants prevented minorities,
and especially African Americans, from purchasing the homes that so
79

See, e.g., CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF PREJUDICE IN HOUSING 173
(1955) (citing Robert K. Merton, A New Psychological Factor, in RACE PREJUDICE AND
DISCRIMINATIONS 510 (Arnold M. Rose ed., 1948)).
80
JEANNINE BELL, HATE THY NEIGHBOR: MOVE-IN VIOLENCE AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL
SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN HOUSING 1 (2013). For more on these incidents, see Jeannine Bell, Hate
Thy Neighbor: Violent Racial Exclusion and the Persistence of Segregation, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 47,
48, 51 (2007).
81
Black Couple Files Lawsuit Claiming Home Value Was Underestimated by Half a Million Dollars
Because of Their Race, CBS NEWS (Dec. 8, 2021, 12:40 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/homeappraisal-race-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/WWB3-KUER]; see also Debra Kamin, Black Homeowners
Face Discrimination in Appraisals, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/08/25/realestate/blacks-minorities-appraisals-discrimination.html [https://perma.cc/2TFZ-L3JY]
(describing a Gallup and Brookings Institution finding that a house in a majority-Black neighborhood
was likely to be valued at 23% less than a very similar house in a majority-white neighborhood).
82
See, e.g., CITY ROOTS CMTY. LAND TR. & YALE ENV’T PROT. CLINIC, supra note 59, at 6–7 (citing
racial covenants as part of the reason for the racial wealth gap); Decades-Old Racist Covenants on
Property Deeds Have Lasting Effect in New Jersey, NEWS 12 N.J. (Feb. 14, 2022, 12:13 PM)
https://newjersey.news12.com/decades-old-racist-covenants-on-property-deeds-have-lasting-effect-innew-jersey [https://perma.cc/RC2Z-FKCV] (same).
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frequently act as the major asset of any given family. My own view is
somewhat different; I think it is risky to rely on home ownership as the chief
route to lasting wealth, however appealing home ownership may be. A
painful lesson of the 2008 housing crisis was that home prices can fall as
well as rise; more diversified assets are a safer bet, and not just for African
Americans, but for others as well. I also suspect that other forms of
discrimination were more important in preventing many African Americans
from acquiring wealth that they could pass on to the next generation.
Employment discrimination is likely a major factor, along with
discrimination and neglect in the provision of education, health, and public
safety in minority areas.
Having said that, one cannot discount differential opportunity for home
ownership as a contributor to larger unequal access to wealth, especially
since government programs such as FHA insurance long favored white home
buyers while stinting minorities, even after the FHA guidelines dropped the
explicit preference for racial segregation.83 Lending favoritism has been
compounded by the income-tax advantages of home ownership—again, a
benefit available to white homebuyers but not minority renters. Programs
like these, by favoring white homebuyers over minorities, undoubtedly have
caused a relative lag in public investment in minority neighborhoods, given
the influence that homeowners are likely to exert over local politics.84 And
here, of course, racial restrictions did play a role in hemming minorities into
those very neighborhoods. Thus, whatever one may think of homeownership
as a vehicle for savings, racial covenants had an effect on families’
differential ability to use that vehicle for investment; and somewhat more
subtly, racial covenants undermined investment in the public goods that are
more likely to be enjoyed in neighborhoods of homeowners.
III. WHAT WAS THE ROLE OF PROPERTY LAW?
Racially restrictive covenants denied large racial groups access to the
most dynamic sector of residential property in the first half of the twentieth
century: newly created subdivisions. They also severely limited residential
opportunities in the central cities to which many minorities were migrating.
In addition, even after these restrictions became formally illegal, they left an
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FREUND, supra note 41, at 128–35, 186–90, 195.
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 1 (2001); see also Brad Plumer
& Nadja Popovich, How Decades of Racist Housing Policy Left Neighborhoods Sweltering, N.Y. TIMES,
(Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/08/24/climate/racism-redlining-citiesglobal-warming.html [https://perma.cc/2MMK-X3JZ] (describing “redlined” minority neighborhoods
lacking trees, parks, and open space that moderates heat).
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attitudinal residue that continued to constrain residential opportunities for
the same groups.
As covenants running with the land, these racial restrictions certainly
fell under the rubric of property law. But was there something about property
law that made this long episode of discrimination inevitable? I think not, but
with the major caveat that like all law, property law is malleable, and the
relevant actors may shape it in ways that in hindsight look like gross
distortions. Nevertheless, even at the outset of the widespread use of racial
covenants, there were many elements of property law that suggested that
these covenants would not pass a test of legality.
One such element was nuisance law. Race as a nuisance category went
nowhere. The best known case came from Kansas in 1883, where a white
homeowner complained that a neighbor was taking revenge on him by
creating a nuisance, that is, renting to “worthless negroes.”85 The state
supreme court rejected the argument out of hand.86 No one could be a
nuisance simply because of who she was; nuisance liability depended on
action.87 Even southern courts agreed, although the doctrine frayed at the
edges at times when plaintiffs brought up thinly disguised discrimination in
the form of complaints about noise or boisterous fun.88
Racial zoning by public bodies fell by the wayside in the 1917
Buchanan case mentioned earlier, but even though this was a constitutional
law case, the Court’s reasoning was largely based on the freedom that
property law gives owners to buy and sell as they please.89 Indeed, at the
time, the distinction between public zoning and private covenants was not
altogether certain; the NAACP’s later arguments against racial covenants
routinely cited Buchanan’s zoning ruling, although unsuccessfully.90
As to covenants running with the land specifically, in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, courts did a good deal of huffing and puffing
about “restraints on alienation” and how they were disfavored in the law, but
in fact, American courts gave covenants in general a good deal of leeway.
For example, unlike the British courts, they used equity jurisprudence to
permit covenants to run with the land even when the original parties sold out
85

Falloon v. Schilling, 29 Kan. 292, 295 (1883).
Id. at 297.
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Id.
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BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 13, at 33–34; Rachel D. Godsil, Race Nuisance: The Politics of Law
in the Jim Crow Era, 105 MICH. L. REV. 505, 516–19 (2006).
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Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81–82 (1917).
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The NAACP cited Buchanan in conjunction with Gandolfo v. Hartman, in which a lower federal
court had discussed a racial covenant as if it constituted “state action.” 49 F. 181, 182–83 (S.D. Cal.
1892). However, many later cases distinguished or rejected this language. See BROOKS & ROSE, supra
note 13, at 51–53 (describing Gandolfo’s later history in courts).
86

245

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

and no longer had any interest in the property.91 If the courts had not relaxed
the doctrine in this way, we would not have seen the new large-scale housing
developments that began to take shape in the early twentieth century, where
covenants gave neighbors and homeowners associations the ability to
enforce various obligations on one another, even after the original developer
had moved on.
Could those obligations include racial covenants? Obviously many
courts thought so, but there are many reasons they might have said “no.”
Several state supreme courts sidled up to saying “no,” but then backed away.
California and Michigan courts decided that racial covenants against sales
were an unreasonable restraint on alienation; but in a formalism that
preserved housing discrimination, they decided that covenants against
minority use were permissible, meaning that a minority family could buy a
house but not live in it.92 Later on, in the 1940s, when racial covenants were
widespread and clearly affecting housing opportunities in central cities,
several important judicial opinions began to assert that at “equity,” courts
should extend the inquiry beyond the immediate parties to take into account
the housing needs of affected minorities.93
One particularly interesting argument against racial covenants appeared
in a 1922 case in which the African-American would-be resident asserted
that racial covenants treated him as a nuisance because of his person, not
because of his actions.94 He lost the case, but his argument seems entirely
correct, and indeed it is an unspoken reference to the well-known principle
that covenants running with the land must “touch and concern land”—that
is, any such covenant must have some relationship to land uses rather than
to the personal characteristics of the users.95 Closer attention to this basic
property law principle could have stopped racial covenants in their tracks.
The takeaway from all this is that racially restrictive covenants were
basically a manipulation of a property law tool—the covenant running with
the land—that was emerging in the early-twentieth century to deal with new
forms of large-scale real estate transactions. Defanging racial covenants in
Shelley then involved a different manipulation, this time of emerging
91
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constitutional law, but in the following years, no one quite knew what to do
with Shelley’s sweeping determination that mere judicial enforcement turned
these covenants into state action.96
Given the constraints available in plain old property law, it did not have
to be this way. But then, why was it this way? What made courts give racial
covenants a pass in property law for several very significant decades in the
development of American real estate practice? From my reading in this area,
I have a few brief but definitely rebuttable suggestions.
First, I think that we tend today to underestimate the profundity of racial
prejudice at the turn of the twentieth century, the time at which developers
began to use racial covenants extensively. It is startling now to find out that
the entire state of Oregon (in which I live today) had a constitutional
provision against African-American entry from 1857 to 1926, although it
was not particularly effective.97 It is equally startling to learn that beginning
in about 1890, just at the outset of the Great Migration to northern and
midwestern cities, many “sundown towns” in northern and midwestern states
attempted to keep out African Americans and expel those who were already
residents.98 Older cases (not to speak of older commentaries) are shocking to
read today in their utterly casual racism. In one example, in a 1907 Kentucky
case contesting the use of an adjacent burial plot in a cemetery, the judge
discussed at some length whether the burial of an African American was
comparable to the burial of a dog.99
A second important factor was fear of violence. The influx of African
Americans from southern rural areas to northern and midwestern cities was
relatively new at the time that racial covenants began to be used widely, and
racial conflicts broke out many times between 1900 and 1925.100 While
harassment and violence were the means by which many working-class
white neighborhoods kept minorities out, racial covenants appealed to a
middle class that sought peaceful and law-abiding ways to maintain
separation between the races without resorting to violence themselves.101
A third was the self-fulfilling prophecy described earlier—the belief
that minority presence caused property values to drop.102 This belief both
96
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rationalized racially restrictive covenants and was in turn strengthened by
them. Given the fact that for most homeowners, the home is the most
important family asset, anything that threatens it threatens not only personal
tastes, but the family future as well. Indeed, personal tastes do not even have
to play a role. The homeowner can say, sometimes truthfully, that the
neighbor’s race does not matter to her—but it does matter to the real estate
market, and hence after her assessment of the attitudes of others, no, she does
not want minority neighbors.103
When one adds up these factors, they result in racial covenants as one
among several denials of opportunity for minorities—and with the denial of
opportunity, the denial of equal economic status over a longer run.
There is more, though, having to do with the symbolic significance of
property. I have often argued that a property regime depends on the mutual
respect and forbearance of the community; the members must be willing to
forgo chances to cheat or take things from one another, and to leave others
to acquire and deal with their assets as they please within the community’s
rules.104 The sad fact is that many white persons and white-dominated
institutions refused to recognize African Americans and Asians as full
members of the political and economic community, and the limitations put
on minorities to acquire and dispose of property were a mark of disrespect
and of what some have called “othering.”105
At the extreme was the terrible and disgraceful destruction of Tulsa’s
Greenwood neighborhood in 1921, an event so shameful that even white
Tulsans would not speak of it for almost a century,106 or on a smaller scale
was the mean-spirited move-in violence that has so often greeted minority
“pioneers” to a neighborhood.107 This kind of behavior is not motivated by
property law. It is anti-property and a complete rejection of any conceivable
version of what property law stands for. It can only be understood as an
unconscionable denial that a substantial number of our fellow citizens are
full members of the rights-bearing community at all.
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Racially restrictive covenants did not go so far as to destroy the existing
property of minority groups. Instead, they curtailed normal opportunities to
acquire property. But even these measures had little to do with the
conventional modern reasons to have property regimes—that is, to
encourage effort, planning and inventiveness, and indirectly to enrich the
larger community. On the contrary, quite aside from the profound disrespect
that racial restrictions showed to minority citizens, by foreclosing ownership
to those citizens, they reduced market opportunities for everyone, even
though most specifically and harmfully to minority members.
CONCLUSION
It is undeniable that racial covenants were constructed on a version of
property law, however questionable or even spurious, and that they could not
have existed without some successful manipulation of that body of law. The
decades-long legal existence of racial covenants suggests that property law
is indeed susceptible to perverse manipulation, as are other areas of the law.
The long existence of these pernicious covenants thus raises the question
whether we can expect our property law, or any area of the law, to be much
better than the people and institutions that shape it. But in the end, it evades
our own responsibility to blame property law for the failings of our
predecessors, or for our own failings in correcting the consequences of
their actions.
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